Resisting the Engineering of Life

From: Redesigning Life? The Worldwide Challenge to Genetic Engineering, edited by Brian Tokar (London: Zed Books, February 2001).

For more than a quarter century — since the first successful attempts at splicing and recombining DNA in the laboratory — people knowledgeable about genetics, ecology, agricultural science and numerous related subjects have voiced concerns about the social and environmental consequences of genetic engineering. But for much of the American public — and people around the world — biotechnology seemed to be just another new idea, only recently emerged from the annals of science fiction. Compared to such pressing environmental concerns as the disappearance of living species and habitat, the destruction of forests and rivers, and the chemical poisoning of our air and water, biotechnology seemed to be a relatively distant concern, one that most people could safely put on the back burner.

The world looks very different today. The rapid commercialization of genetically engineered crops, the stunning pace of developments in animal cloning, human “gene therapy,” and the effects of bioprospecting and gene patenting on traditional cultures are awakening people from their complacency. Public actions against the biotechnology industry are spreading throughout the world. They have taken on as many different forms as the diverse peoples and societies that are threatened by the biotechnology industry’s effects on the earth’s biological and cultural diversity. These actions have begun to inspire a new wave of activism against biotechnology in the United States.

For several years, officials of biotechnology companies like Monsanto have told people in Europe and Asia that farmers and consumers in the United States willingly accept genetic engineered products. While every survey of public opinion in recent years has revealed overwhelming skepticism toward genetic engineering, especially in agriculture,1 there have only been a few high profile public actions and campaigns of the kind we have seen elsewhere in the world. Activists from other countries often ask, “Why is there not yet such a widespread and highly visible movement against genetic engineering in the United States?”

While public opposition to genetic engineering in the U.S. is just beginning to attain the high profile of efforts against nuclear power, forest destruction, and toxic chemical pollution, developments in biotechnology have been opposed and resisted here ever since the technologies of genetic manipulation were first developed by scientists. In fact, the first words of caution about the possible dangers of genetic engineering came from the molecular biologists themselves. It all began in 1973 when two researchers at Stanford University succeeded in transferring a hybrid plasmid — a ring of DNA including a foreign, spliced-in bacterial gene — into a particular strain of E. coli bacteria. Almost immediately, proposals emerged for a plethora of previously impossible experiments: cloning cancer genes, merging and cloning viruses, exchanging genes among different species of animals and plants, and numerous others.

In the winter of 1975, over 100 internationally respected molecular biologists met near Monterey, on the central California coast, to discuss the future of recombinant DNA technology. Wishing to head off the possibility that their own experiments or their colleagues’ might present a public hazard, and fearful that Congress might otherwise soon act to regulate their experiments, the scientists endorsed a call for national research guidelines to contain potentially hazardous experiments. The more hazardous an experiment might be, the more special protection would be required for laboratory facilities. The scale of planned experiments was to be limited, and intentional releases of genetically modified organisms into the open environment would be prohibited.2

As soon as these guidelines were enacted by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the main federal agency that funds biological research in the United States, research universities across the country announced plans to build specialized containment laboratories for potentially hazardous gene-splicing experiments. In university cities from Cambridge, Massachusetts to San Diego, California, people alarmed about the dangers of these facilities actively opposed their construction. Scores of hearings, public forums, letter-writing campaigns and demonstrations were organized for people to air their opposition. The effort in Cambridge brought together figures such as Nobel Prize-winning biologist George Wald and the city’s populist mayor Al Velucci, along with other critical scientists and community activists. But most biologists, even those who had just recently raised concerns about the hazards of gene-splicing, were now called upon to defend facilities that they needed in order to continue their research. While scientists such as Wald, and members of the activist group Science for the People, raised scientific and ethical questions in opposition to the labs, others condemned lab opponents as misinformed Luddites spreading an irrational fear of science.

In many communities, the issue became a lightning rod for residents’ long-simmering anger over the local political and economic power of large, wealthy universities located in economically troubled urban neighborhoods. Several cities, including Cambridge, established citizen review commissions to review gene-splicing experiments, and local regulations were passed in nearly a dozen cities overall.3 Meanwhile, the NIH guidelines helped forestall any Congressional action against genetic engineering. Although several minor scandals involving the possible release of dangerous materials were reported in the scientific press, the public debate was muted and the guidelines were progressively weakened over time.4 Gene-splicing rapidly became the technology of choice in an ever-widening range of biological disciplines, and corporations large and small were beginning to invest heavily in the new technology. “The promise of economic payoff,” reports historian of science Pnina Abir-Am, “led to a quick dismantling of the remaining regulations.”5

By 1983, the NIH had withdrawn its list of prohibited experiments, done away with containment requirements for all but the most severely pathogenic organisms, and moved to replace the ban on intentional releases of engineered organisms with a comprehensive review process. A Stanford University scientist had been approved to field-test a lysine-enhanced corn variety in 1980, and a Cornell experiment in 1982 involved tomato and tobacco plants containing bacterial genes for antibiotic resistance. But the first widespread public opposition to the deliberate release of genetically engineered organisms came in California, after scientists at the state university gained approval to field-test a variety of soil bacteria that were genetically altered to inhibit frost formation on the leaves and flowers of plants.

Scientists had learned that the formation of ice crystals on plants depends on the ability of particular soil bacteria to act as catalysts for ice formation. By deleting the gene for a key “ice nucleation” protein, and then releasing populations of so-called “ice-minus” bacteria onto a field, the Berkeley-based researchers suggested that the naturally occurring bacteria would be unable to perform their icing role, and crops could be protected from freezing. Jeremy Rifkin’s Foundation for Economic Trends filed a suit against the NIH, arguing that the ecological consequences of this unprecedented experiment had not been considered, and that an Environmental Impact Statement was needed. Echoing the concerns of several well-known ecologists and atmospheric scientists, the suit highlighted the possibility that ice-minus bacteria could alter the wintering cycles of native plants, or perhaps interfere with the formation of ice crystals in the upper atmosphere that are necessary for the development of clouds.6 The particular bacteria being studied were also known to be pathogenic to some plants, a quality which might be enhanced or otherwise affected by genetic manipulation. In May of 1984, a federal judge halted the planned experiment and ordered an Environmental Impact Statement for any future releases.7

While the University of California worked to satisfy federal requirements, a private company closely linked to the University initiated its own petition to test ice-minus bacteria. As a private company, not reliant upon NIH funding, Advanced Genetic Sciences (AGS) was able to bypass NIH oversight and apply directly to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for a release of frost-inhibiting bacteria in agriculturally-rich Monterey County. A local Christmas tree farmer named Glenn Church petitioned county officials to intervene, citing possible effects on the area’s farm economy.8 County residents opposed to the test wrote letters and filled hearing rooms; they gathered support statewide, and internationally as well. A telegram from the Green delegates in the West German parliament (Bundestag) helped convince Monterey County officials first to postpone the test, and then to amend the county’s land use plan so as to effectively prohibit releases of genetically engineered organisms.9

In 1986, AGS made headlines in the San Francisco Bay Area when an employee leaked the news of an illegal release of ice-minus bacteria into trees planted on the roof of the company’s Oakland headquarters; the protests that followed gained nationwide media attention.10 Further information leaks from AGS laboratories revealed that employees had been suffering from persistent allergic reactions and sinus troubles, possibly associated with these bacteria. Still, despite repeated legal interventions and intense local controversy, AGS gained approval to release its frost-inhibiting bacteria in the East Bay town of Brentwood in April of 1987.

It was a chilly April night, the beginning of northern California’s long dry season. Through well-groomed apple and pear orchards and newly-planted corn fields, a small band of eco-saboteurs crept toward their target. Ahead was a field of strawberries, just beginning to show their spring blossoms, but this was no ordinary strawberry field. It was surrounded by a high chain-link fence with barbed wire, a trailer full of hired guards, and a symmetrical array of towers with Petri plates, sensors and other modern biological test equipment. The next morning at 7 A.M., Advanced Genetic Sciences was scheduled to conduct the first authorized open-air test of genetically altered bacteria, and demonstrate whether these bacteria would indeed inhibit the formation of frost crystals on the leaves and flowers of the plants. Before scores of reporters, and TV cameras from as far away as Tokyo, AGS was ready to officially inaugurate the Age of Biotechnology.

It must have been quite a shock to the assembled corporate and government officials when dawn finally arose on the morning of April 24th. Over 2000 strawberry plants, more than 80% of the total, had been pulled out of the ground during the night. Almost none had any blossoms left. The perpetrators had come and gone while the security guards were asleep, and had disappeared into the night.11

Public relations, not science, was the order of the day, however. As reporters began to arrive on the scene, AGS hurriedly stuffed the uprooted plants into the ground and scientists dressed in full-body hazardous materials suits, as ordered by EPA, began spraying their bacteria. The next day’s world headlines reflected the company’s thoroughly dubious claim that their experiment was a success. Industry spokespeople trumpeted their promises of bigger and better miracles ahead.

Just a year later, however, the situation looked very different. Two more tests of the anti-frost bacteria were carried out in California and both were effectively sabotaged by test opponents. Local opposition continued to grow, both among suburban dwellers and the area’s Mexican farmworker communities. The local press revealed, contrary to company claims, that escaped bacteria from the first test were detected well beyond the test plot.12 When plants were put in laboratory freezers — natural frost is rare in this part of California at any time of year — they still froze within a degree or two of 32 Fahrenheit. AGS research director John Bedbrook told the New York Times , “If we have to go through a huge amount of effort to educate [sic] every community, the cost is going to be beyond us.”13 As the 1989 growing season began, AGS withdrew their application to continue field tests of ice-minus bacteria in California.

Printed statements from those involved in the first-ever direct actions against genetic engineered organisms reflected their committed local support, and a wide-ranging political outlook. Prior to the second Brentwood test, opponents prepared leaflets in both English and Spanish and held a public march and caravan from the local school to the test site. When the University of California began testing ice-minus bacteria in Tulelake, near the Oregon border, local residents reportedly helped eco-saboteurs find the carefully-hidden test site. A group claiming responsibility for pulling up thousands of ice-minus sprayed potato plants in Tulelake issued a communiqué stating in part:

“The genetic engineering industry is only the most recent example of this civilization’s drive to subjugate nature to its own ends. This world view has resulted in unprecedented attacks against the ecosystems we depend on for life. We need to evolve beyond the worldview that pits humanity against nature, and which is a product of the conjunction of patriarchy and capitalism.”

Test opponents of all political views knew that the release of anti-frost bacteria was only the beginning. These organisms clearly were not being released into the environment because farmers wanted them, and they would probably never be a profitable commercial product, given the exorbitant costs of production. The bacteria were being released, many concluded, because they appeared to have fewer obvious pitfalls than many of the other genetically engineered life forms that were being developed in laboratories around the world. Once these bacteria were released, the industry hoped it would have a free reign for the future.

The Foundation on Economic Trends, which had filed suit to halt the ice-minus field tests in California, continued its series of pioneering lawsuits against the biotechnology industry and its cohorts in government. They sued the Department of Agriculture for encouraging the development of genetically engineered farm animals, and obtained a permanent injunction against the Defense Department’s plan to test biological aerosols at the Pentagon’s Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. The Foundation’s lawyers challenged the first genetically engineered rabies vaccine (which was to be tested on wildlife), the development of patented mice with the AIDS virus spliced into their chromosomes, and the first attempts at human gene therapy.14

Still, despite these interventions, and those of several national environmental groups, the Reagan and Bush administrations effectively dismantled the long-range effort by a number of federal agencies to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework for products of genetic engineering. This left a patchwork of regulations, each developed for a different purpose, which are applied to genetically engineered organisms on a case-by-case basis. One EPA office regulates pesticides, another toxic substances; the Department of Agriculture (USDA) reviews field tests, while the FDA is mandated to evaluate food safety.

This multiplicity of hurdles may have held up approval of a few products, however many others have simply fallen through the regulatory cracks. For example, the EPA regulates pesticides, including biopesticides such as Bt, but the FDA is barred from offering information about pesticides on food labels. Thus food safety officials claim they are unable to require labeling of Bt crops, even though every plant cell produces active bacterial toxin.15 In 1989, when 27 people died of a rare blood disease associated with a particular genetically engineered source of the amino acid tryptophan, the FDA suddenly pulled all tryptophan supplements from the market.16 There was never a thorough investigation of the source of the suspect batches, in this case, the Japanese company Showa Denko. If a substance is considered safe when extracted from natural sources, the agency simply assumes that genetically engineered varieties are safe as well; if a genetically engineered product causes problems, the problem must be with the product itself, not the manner in which it was produced.

During the presidency of George Bush, the highly controversial Council on Competitiveness, operated out of Vice President Dan Quayle’s office, reduced the biotechnology industry’s regulatory accountability even further. Under the leaky umbrellas of “performance-based standards” and “substantial equivalence,” products of biotechnology were deemed in 1991 to require no special scrutiny beyond what is required for non-genetically engineered varieties of the same product. The inherent differences between genetically engineered and conventional varieties of various food crops, drugs, etc. were declared irrelevant, except for special cases, such as substances already known to be allergenic. The USDA’s requirement for field test permits for engineered crops was replaced by a simple, after-the-fact notification. Genetically engineered drugs, food products, and microbes would now be approved without any consideration of the special risks and uncertainties of gene manipulation.17 This is the period when biotech industry representatives would have us believe that the initial “public debate” on genetic engineering happened in the United States; in reality only the very closest observers knew anything of this consistent pattern of regulatory neglect and abandonment.

The U.S. government’s abdication of meaningful regulatory responsibility for products of biotechnology soon opened the floodgates for the entry of genetically engineered ingredients into our food supply. The first such product was genetically engineered rennet for the production of cheese. Jeremy Rifkin and other biotechnology opponents perceived that it would be difficult to raise a public outcry against this product, which is not present in food in measurable quantities. Rennet, essentially a mixture of digestive enzymes, is traditionally extracted from one of the lower stomachs of young calves. Rifkin and others were concerned that producing enzymes from vats of genetically engineered bacteria might be seen by many environmentalists and animal rights advocates as preferable to extracting rennet from calves .

Bovine Growth Hormone was a different story. Farmers and food safety advocates immediately realized that this genetically engineered hormone (produced by bacteria genetically “enhanced” with cow DNA) represented a potential threat to both milk producers and consumers. While the human health consequences of synthetic (recombinant) BGH were just beginning to be studied, farm activists realized that the promised increase in milk production could have dire consequences for an already depressed family farm sector.18 One study predicted that a third of all dairy farmers in the United States could be forced out of business in five years if the hormone were to be widely used.

This concern was dramatized by the efforts of a lone Wisconsin dairy farmer named John Kinsman. Kinsman discovered that the student union at the University of Wisconsin in Madison was serving ice cream made with milk from cows that were being injected with experimental rBGH. He traveled to Madison in mid-winter and began picketing the union with a sign explaining what the students were unknowingly consuming. Kinsman’s one-person campaign helped spark a nationwide alliance of farmers and citizens that would delay by several years the government’s approval for commercial use of the hormone. Jeremy Rifkin’s Foundation announced plans for a nationwide alliance of farmers, consumers and animal rights advocates to prevent the acceptance of rBGH by the dairy industry.

In 1989, Richard Burroughs, an FDA veterinarian, was fired for raising questions about the manipulation of experimental data on the effects of BGH injections on milk cows (see FERRARA chapter). Then, a disgruntled staff scientist at the University of Vermont (UVM) went public with data that revealed serious problems with that institution’s Monsanto-funded BGH research. Just as the FDA’s approval of rBGH appeared imminent, the Vermont revelations helped force a public reopening of the case.19

As the story goes, veterinary pathologist Marla Lyng was refused permission to perform autopsies on certain aborted calf fetuses at the UVM experimental farm in Burlington. A few abnormal fetuses may have been buried surreptitiously. Lyng lost her job at the end of 1989, and then released copies of the farm’s cow health records to state legislators while her firing was under appeal. One state representative with a dairy farming background was given the raw data to re-analyze and was appalled by the results. In addition to nutritional problems and frequent udder infections (mastitis), BGH-injected cows showed a high incidence of reproductive problems, from retained placentas and uterine infections, to high rates of spontaneous abortions and severely deformed offspring.20 Even daughters of rBGH-treated cows had aborted fetuses with bizarre genetic defects: fluid-filled holes in the head, improper bone development, and even double pelvises supporting extra legs. The UVM findings also confirmed that medical problems in cows injected with rBGH use required higher than normal doses of antibiotics.21 These revelations sparked an investigation by the U.S. Congress’ General Accounting Office, which helped delayed the approval of rBGH by highlighting “potential biases” in Monsanto’s research methods and decrying the company’s systematic withholding of data.22

Monsanto’s recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone was approved by the FDA for commercial sale beginning in 1994, and widespread reports of serious health problems in injected cows soon followed.23 Instead of addressing the causes of farmers’ complaints about rBGH, however, Monsanto went on the offensive, threatening to sue small dairy companies that advertised their products as free of the artificial hormone.24 Opponents of rBGH stepped up their efforts. The Minnesota-based Pure Food Campaign, originally an offshoot of the Foundation for Economic Trends, coordinated demonstrations in major cities across the country, including numerous high-profile public milk-dumpings by farmers and consumers. Media coverage was impressive in the first months of rBGH use, and the reporting was often uncharacteristically sympathetic to the opponents. The Vermont state legislature passed the first mandatory labeling bill for rBGH-tainted dairy products in March of 1994, and Maine, Wisconsin and Minnesota attempted similar legislation. Over 100 school districts from Vermont to Los Angeles passed resolutions against rBGH products in their cafeterias, and a lawsuit was filed against the FDA to expose the rampant conflicts of interest among the staff responsible for rBGH approval.

The landmark Vermont labeling law proved short lived, however, and the story offers important lessons for continuing efforts to label genetically engineered foods in the U.S. Over a year after the law’s passage, there were still no labels. Activists became increasingly mired in legislative rule-making and hesitated to confront a Democratic governor who was conspicuously trying to play both sides. There were endless legislative attempts to weaken the law and, finally, a lawsuit by leading trade associations representing the dairy industry, grocers, food processors, and several others.

Instead of going on the offensive against the industry’s blatant attempts to sabotage rBGH labeling, staff members for Vermont farm and consumer groups sought compromise. Lacking confidence that the industry lawsuit could be beaten in the courts, and reluctant to raise the stakes politically, they quietly supported plans to modify the labeling rules and make them less costly to manufacturers. The onus for labeling would fall upon individual grocers rather than the manufacturers, eventually allowing industry lobbyists to portray rBGH labeling as an undue burden on small, rural shopkeepers. The state’s Republican Attorney General at first hesitated to defend the law in court, then agreed to do so only on the grounds of consumer preference, rather than the necessities of public health. This opened the door to a federal appeals court ultimately striking down Vermont’s labeling law on the grounds that it violated the companies’ constitutional right to refuse to speak.25 By the end of the saga, many supporters had tired of the long, defensive battle to defend a law that, in the end, only indirectly offered consumers the information they wanted.

Local and national efforts continued to focus on major dairy processors that supported the use of rBGH by farmers. A few companies agreed to go rBGH-free, while others dug in their heels in defense of this first widely available product of genetic engineering.26 Several national organizations focused their efforts on a federal rBGH-labeling bill, sponsored by Vermont Representative Bernie Sanders, although the industry’s powerful friends in Washington were clearly going to succeed in preventing such a bill from ever reaching the House floor.27

While political initiatives against rBGH foundered, consumer opposition remained strong. Whole milk dealers throughout the Northeast continued to risk lawsuits from Monsanto and label their products as free of synthetic hormones. Ben and Jerry’s Ice Cream successfully challenged an Illinois state law banning “rBGH-free” labels. Organic milk, which was extremely hard to find even in dairy-producing regions in the early 1990s, became much more widely available. Farmers’ continuing troubles with Monsanto’s hormone, combined with the vocal concerns of dairy consumers, have effectively derailed the company’s plans to make rBGH injections a routine practice for dairy farmers across the U.S.

A similar mix of consumer pressure and simple product failure ended the short career of the first genetically engineered vegetable to be approved for sale in the United States, the so-called Flavr-Savr tomato. Developed by the Davis, California biotechnology company, Calgene, these tomatoes were genetically altered to ripen more slowly and thus appear fresher on store shelves; the company promised a shelf life of several weeks. First, a threatened boycott drove Campbell Soup to announce that it would not use the product, despite the company’s considerable investment in its development. Efforts to test-market the tomatoes in California and the Chicago area foundered, as news reports raised questions about the product’s much-touted flavor. Activists raised concerns about the safety of the engineered tomatoes, rival companies challenged Calgene’s patent, and Calgene found that their tomatoes were easily bruised by mechanical harvesting and packing.28 By 1995, production was suspended both in Florida and Mexico. In 1996, Monsanto bought Calgene, along with Florida’s leading tomato packing company, Gargiulo L.P., but even this new corporate alliance was unable to salvage the first genetically engineered tomatoes.

Meanwhile, genetically engineered varieties of other basic food crops were being developed and tested at an astonishing pace. In 1990, two scientists at the National Wildlife Federation, Drs. Margaret Mellon and Jane Rissler began closely monitoring applications to the USDA and EPA for field tests of genetically engineered plants and microorganisms. By the spring of 1991, they had identified 149 such tests in 30 states (plus Puerto Rico); a year later the number had more than tripled. By the time Mellon and Rissler shifted their project to the Union of Concerned Scientists during the winter of 1993-94, there had been over a thousand field tests, and by the end of 1994 there were well over 2000 in all but seven states.29 Mellon and Rissler intervened against government moves to weaken regulations for genetically engineered organisms, petitioned federal agencies to consider the health risks of engineered foods, and carried out the first comprehensive analysis of the potential ecological risks of genetically engineered crops.30

Other organizations, from the Consumers Union and the Environmental Defense Fund to a wide variety of grassroots state and regional groups, also questioned the adequacy of health and safety research, challenged inadequate enforcement and worked to educate consumers. But the overwhelming influence of the biotechnology industry at the highest levels of the Clinton/Gore administration severely limited these groups’ ability to make change within official channels. One of the early signals of Clinton’s loyalty to the biotechnology industry was the release of an “interpretive statement” on the U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity. The statement, which sought to eliminate the requirement for companies to share research on biological resources with the people from whose lands those resources are derived.31 The ensuing controversy helped set the stage for the administration’s consistently obstructionist role in the negotiations that ultimately led to the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol.32

During the same period, biotechnology industry funds were beginning to drastically alter research priorities at universities across the United States. This became a matter of intense controversy on many campuses and in their surrounding communities. Students protested the construction of new biotech research facilities at Ohio University, the University of Pennsylvania and several University of California campuses, among others. In Burlington, Vermont the city sponsored a series of public forums in anticipation of the University of Vermont’s new biotechnology center, and unruly protests forced the university to cancel a gala outdoor opening ceremony for the facility. In 1998, public opposition and NIH scrutiny helped scale back a proposed $300 million research agreement between Sandoz (now Novartis) and the Scripps Research Institute, near San Diego; a similar deal between Novartis and the University of California at Berkeley, which offered research funds and access to corporate databases in exchange for first rights to exploitable discoveries, sparked citywide controversy as well.33

In New York City, officials of Columbia University and a number of biotech companies announced plans to build a major biotechnology research park in Harlem, on the site of the famous Audubon Ballroom. The Ballroom had played an important part in the lives of countless African-American activists and artists, and was the site of Malcolm X’s assassination; the project became the center of a struggle pitting Harlem-based activists, Green Party members, and many others against much of the city’s business and political establishment.34 In Philadelphia, activists opposed the demolition of an historic university building for a biotechnology facility funded largely by the Defense Department. Activists in San Francisco, New York and other major cities challenged public officials from across the political spectrum who touted biotechnology as a futuristic new industry that would revive their cities’ faltering economies.

Several prominent scientists also voiced criticisms of the biotechnology industry’s claims, and decried its insidious influence on scientific practice and research agendas. The Boston-based Council for Responsible Genetics, which emerged from the original 1970s debates over the containment of engineered organisms, articulated a wide-ranging critique of the emerging genetic determinism in biological research and medical practice.35 The groups spoke out in defense of those who faced discrimination due to the findings of genetic screening tests, critiqued pseudo-scientific claims of a genetic basis for intelligence and “criminality,” and helped raise public understanding of the continuing risks of genetic experimentation. Critical scientists and other U.S. activists and NGOs also played an important role in international debates around biosafety, intellectual property and bioprospecting, exposing the behind-the-scenes machinations of the biotechnology industry to increasing public scrutiny.

The large-scale commercialization of genetically engineered foods began in the United States in the fall of 1996, as approved varieties of engineered soybeans, corn, potatoes and squash were harvested by growers and shipped without notice to supermarkets and food processing plants nationwide. The Pure Food Campaign and other groups organized demonstrations across the country, eventually calling for a series of Global Days of Action against genetically engineered foods. The first such event, in April of 1997, featured demonstrations and public gatherings in 19 U.S. cities, as well as 17 European countries, India, the Philippines, Malaysia, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil and Ethiopia. Six months later, there were protests and educational events during a two week period in some fifty cities worldwide.36

Greenpeace undertook two dramatic early actions against genetically engineered crops in the U.S. In October of 1996, Greenpeace activists used a milk-based dye to paint a 100-foot “X” on a field of Roundup-resistant soybeans in Iowa. The paint was visible from the air, and the action attracted significant media attention. A month later, Greenpeace’s inflatable boats sought to block a ship containing genetically engineered soybeans from leaving Cargill’s grain facility on the Mississippi River, outside of New Orleans.37 But this soon appeared to be the peak of Greenpeace’s involvement in the issue on this side of the Atlantic. In the summer of 1997, the organization closed all of its campaign offices in the U.S., and their involvement with biotechnology was limited for many years to issue updates, lobbying in Washington, and support for a few small, local demonstrations.

An important shift in U.S. activism against genetic engineering occurred in 1998 when members of the Gateway Green Alliance, based in Monsanto’s home town of St. Louis, organized a major international activist conference. Dubbed the “First Grassroots Gathering on Biodevastation: Genetic Engineering,” the July 1998 gathering was the first in the U.S. to emphasize grassroots activism and public education over policy analysis and behind-the-scenes interventions. It was co-sponsored by over 30 groups, and attracted participants from all across the country, as well as from Canada, England, Ireland, Mexico, India and Japan. A coalition of Japanese farmer and consumer groups brought a delegation of more than 20 representatives.

The gathering’s closing plenary approved a “Biodevastation Declaration,” which had been drafted by a participant from the Council of Canadians, and offered a comprehensive outlook on the problems of biotechnology. The 200 participants also agreed by acclamation to several specific demands: a ban on rBGH and the genetic engineering of plants and animals; an end to the patenting of DNA sequences, the Human Genome Diversity Project, the National Violence Initiative Project, and the development of Terminator seed technology; a halt to the testing of experimental drugs on prisoners, Native Americans and others; and the encouragement of organic farming, local food systems, home-scale gardening and ecosystem restoration, as alternatives to corporate monocrop agriculture. A colorful demonstration outside Monsanto’s world headquarters in a suburb just outside St. Louis featured puppets, skits and speeches by international activists.38

The year 1998 also saw an impressive public outcry by consumers of organic foods, who demanded that genetically engineered products be excluded from the U.S. government’s labeling rules for organic foods. When the White House budget office (OMB) insisted that the USDA consider allowing products of genetic engineering to be labeled organic, more than 275,000 people wrote cards, letters and testimony objecting to this and other perceived violations of widely-accepted organic practices. Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman, who two years earlier had traveled through Europe threatening a trade war if countries tried to ban genetically engineered imports from the United States, soon promised that engineered foods would not be labeled organic by the USDA.39

Following the St. Louis gathering, biotech opponents across the United States sought to strengthen local and regional networks, and find ways to raise the profile of their issues in communities nationwide. They pledged to step up public actions against biotechnology companies, seed suppliers and food processors, as well as universities and government agencies with close ties to the biotech industry. Over the next year or so, regional grassroots groups formed under the banner of Resistance Against Genetic Engineering (RAGE) in the Northeast, Pacific Northwest, San Francisco Bay Area, mid-South and upper Midwest,40 while more traditional NGOs coalesced as the Genetic Engineering Action Network (GEAN) and advocates for direct action against genetic engineering created the Bioengineering Action Network (BAN).

A follow-up “Biodevastation” conference was hosted by Vandana Shiva’s organization in New Delhi, India in March of 1999, and a third one, in Seattle two months later, featured a lively demonstration at the annual convention of the Biotechnology Industry Organization (BIO). “Biodevastation 2000,” which preceded that year’s BIO convention in Boston, culminated in a rally and parade by some 4000 people. This was by far the largest show of opposition to genetic engineering in the United States, and one of the largest protests to date specifically focused on biotechnology anywhere in the world.41

Farmers again came to the forefront of opposition to genetic engineering in the U.S. after large grain processors such as Archer Daniels Midland began to lower prices for genetically engineered crops, toward the end of the 1999 growing season. Gary Goldberg, CEO of the American Corn Growers’ Association, urged members to “consider alternatives,” and called GMOs an “albatross around the neck of farmers.”42 In November of 1999, a coalition of more than 30 farm groups, including the corn growers and the National Family Farm Coalition, issued a public declaration, warning that farmers who plant genetically altered seed are risking their own livelihood and the future of the entire farm economy.43 Pressure from farmers and gardeners nationwide compelled over 50 U.S. and Canadian seed companies to sign a pledge promising to “not knowingly” offer genetically engineered varieties.44 Food companies from Gerber Baby Foods to the Whole Foods chain of natural foods supermarkets signed similar pledges amidst growing consumer pressure.

Other groups focused on various legal avenues to oppose genetic engineering. Groups such as the Center for Food Safety, Alliance for Bio-Integrity, and the Foundation on Economic Trends sued several government agencies, including the FDA (for allowing unlabeled genetically engineered foods onto the market), the EPA (for ignoring the dangers of pesticidal crops such as Bt corn) and the Department of Justice (for allowing the biotechnology industry to acquire monopoly power in the commercial seed industry). In November of 1999, a bill calling for the labeling of genetically engineered foods was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives, and a similar bill was introduced in the Senate in February 2000.

The year 1999 also saw the re-emergence of direct actions against genetic engineering in the United States. Approximately twenty separate clandestine uprootings of genetically engineered crops were reported that summer and fall throughout the U.S. and Canada.45 Most were in California, where activists targeted genetic engineering research around the University of California campuses in Berkeley and Davis. When activists cut down half an acre of herbicide tolerant corn at the University of Maine, it attracted statewide and national media attention; three actions in California, Minnesota and Vermont focused on large commercial crops rather than university research stations.46

While specific tactics and organizing methods vary widely, U.S. activists increasingly agree on the need for a more systemic critique of biotechnology in all its forms. While some biotech opponents insist that pressing for food labeling legislation is the most realistic approach, given the limitations of mainstream political discourse in the United States, others see this as a halfway measure at best. Campaigns focusing chiefly on labeling, without a deeper analysis of the institutional roots of genetic engineering, offer the biotech industry many possible outs. Labeling does little to address the environmental hazards of engineered crops, the needs of farmers, or the problems of less affluent families, whose food choices are often quite limited. Some elements of the biotechnology industry clearly seek a compromise on labeling in an attempt to assuage consumer fears, while releasing a minimum of real information. Grassroots activists have voiced dismay that U.S. NGOs might agree to an inadequate compromise on labeling, just as people are becoming aware of the wider implications of the new genetic technologies.

The opposition in Europe, India and elsewhere has not only exposed the profound underlying hazards of genetic engineering and other biotechnologies, but also tapped into a deeply ingrained skepticism toward views of people and the rest of nature as objects to be manipulated and controlled. In Europe, the specter of Nazi eugenics hangs over discussions of genetic engineering and cloning; in India, the seed is a powerful cultural symbol and its manipulation and appropriation by capital is an abomination.

In the U.S., we face considerable cultural, as well as political obstacles to developing a wider movement against biotechnology. We are forced to confront pervasive cultural myths of untrammeled consumerism and a popular science-fiction outlook toward the future. But we also share with our neighbors an ethical commitment to democracy, freedom and love for the land, however manipulated these ideas have been in the past. Biotechnology seeks to rally the public behind its promises of future miracles and dazzle them with its technical wonders. Our movement, if it is to succeed, must peel away the science fiction blinders, deepen our understanding of the integrity of the natural world, challenge the structures of power in society, and present a clear vision of a more ecologically and humanly sustainable way of life.

Notes

1. Barnaby Feder, “Biotech Firm to Advocate Labels on Genetically Altered Products,” New York Times, February 24, 1997; James Walsh, “Brave New Farm,” Time, January 11, 1999, p. 87.
2. Sheldon Krimsky, Biotechnics and Society: The Rise of Industrial Genetics, New York: Praeger, 1991, pp. 100-101; see also James D. Watson and John Tooze, The DNA Story: A Documentary History of Gene Cloning, San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1981.
3. Ibid., p. 102.
4. For example, Nicholas Wade, “DNA: Chapter of Accidents at San Diego,” Science, Vol. 209, September 5, 1980, pp. 1101-02; Charles Marwick, “Genetic engineers in the sin-bin . . .” New Scientist, September 11, 1980, p. 764; Richard A. Knox, “US halts one DNA experiment at Harvard,” Boston Globe, December 16, 1977, p. 1.
5. Pnina G. Abir-Am, “‘New’ trends in the history of molecular biology,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 176.
6. Reginald Rhein, “‘Ice-minus’ bacteria gain EPA approval,” Chemical Week, November 27, 1985, pp. 98-99.
7. Krimsky, op. cit., pp. 117-129; Colin Norman, “Judge Halts Gene-Splicing Experiment,” Science, Vol. 224, pp. 962-63, June 1, 1984; also Ibid.
8. Jonathan C. Drake, “Manmade Mutant Microbes Invade the Central Coast, Santa Cruz Express, February 13, 1986.
9. Philip J. Hilts, “Microbe Test Hits New Snag,” Washington Post, January 17, 1986.
10. Krimsky, op. cit., pp. 123-24; “Halting Designer Bacteria,” Newsweek, February 10, 1986, p. 8.
11. “Homo Fragaria” (pseud.), “The Strawberry Liberation Front,” Earth First! Journal, June 1987, p. 1; Elliot Diringer, “Vandals Fail to Prevent Cloned-Bacteria Spray,” San Francisco Chronicle, April 25, 1987.
12. Amy Axt Hanson, “Second phase of Frostban test started,” Antioch Daily Ledger, April 29, 1987; on the predictability of this, see Peter Aleshire, “Altered bacteria spread very easily, expert says,” Oakland Tribune, April 6, 1986.
13. Keith Schneider, “Biotechnology Lags Despite Success,” New York Times, January 18, 1988.
14. Krimsky, op. cit., pp. 121-23; Jeffrey L. Fox, “Gene Test Redux, Eugenics Advisory Proposed, Bio/technology Vol. 7, March 1989, pp. 205-206.
15. Michael Pollan, “Playing God in the Garden, New York Times Magazine, October 25, 1998, p. 51.
16. See the introduction to Part 2.
17. Christopher Anderson, “US science’s ‘stealth agency’,” Nature, Vol. 353, September 19, 1991, p. 198; Christine Triano, “All the Vice President’s Men,” Washington, D.C.: OMB Watch, September 1991, pp. 28-29.
18. See, for example, Keith Schneider, “Gene-Altered Farm Drug Starts Battle in Milk States,” New York Times, April 29, 1989, p. 1.
19. This account is partially excerpted from Brian Tokar, “The False Promise of Biotechnology,” Z Magazine, February 1992, pp. 27-32.
20. Andrew Christiansen, Recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone: Alarming Tests, Unfounded Approval, Rural Vermont, July 1995, pp. 8-10.
21. Many years of research on the effects of rBGH is summarized in D.S. Kronfeld, “Health management of dairy herds treated with bovine somatotropin,” Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association, Vol. 204, No. 1, January 1994, pp. 116-130; Samuel S. Epstein, “Unlabeled Milk from Cows Treated with Biosynthetic Growth Hormones: A Case of Regulatory Abdication,” International Journal of Health Services, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1996, pp. 173-185; Samuel S. Epstein, “BST: The Public Health Hazards,” The Ecologist, Vol. 19, No. 5, September/October 1989, pp. 191-195.
22. U.S. General Accounting Office, “FDA’s Review of Recombinant Bovine Growth Hormone,” Washington, D.C.: U.S. GAO, Document No. GAO/PEMD-92-26
23. Mark Kastel, Down on the Farm: The Real BGH Story, Rural Vermont, Fall 1995; Brian Tokar, “Biotechnology: The debate heats up,” Z Magazine, June 1995, pp. 49-55.
24. Diane Gershon, “Monsanto sues over BST,” Nature, Vol. 368, March 31, 1994, p. 384.
25. Nick Marro, “Court Strikes Down BGH Label Law,” Barre-Montpelier Times-Argus, August 9, 1996, p. 1.
26. See Tokar, op. cit. 22.
27. Michael Colby, “Activist Malpractice,” Safe Food News, Fall 1994, p. 4.
28. Scott McMurray, “New Calgene Tomato Might Have Tasted Just as Good Without Genetic Alteration,” Wall Street Journal, January 12, 1993; “Stomach Erosions in Genetic Tomato Animal Study Discounted,” Food Chemical News, March 15, 1993, Anne Gonzales, “Production in Mexico Halted,” The Packer, January 30, 1995; Ralph T. King, Jr., “Low-Tech Woe Slows Calgene Super Tomato,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 1995; Ralph T. King, Jr., “Expert Calls Calgene Research On Gene-Altering Method Flawed,” Wall Street Journal, April 24, 1995, John Unrein, “Biotech is pulled in Florida,” The Packer, November 6, 1995.
29. The states with no field tests at the end of 1994 were Nevada, New Mexico, Wyoming, Utah, Vermont, New Hampshire and Rhode Island. Figures are from Mellon and Rissler’s publication, The Gene Exchange, archived at www.ucsusa.org.
30. Jane Rissler and Margaret Mellon, Perils Amidst the Promise: Ecological Risks of Transgenic Crops in a Global Market, Washington, D.C.: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1993, revised and republished as The Ecological Risks of Engineered Crops, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.
31. See Brian Tokar, “Environmentalism, Clinton Style,” Z Magazine, October 1993, pp. 34-35.
32. For an account of these proceedings, see Beth Burrows, “Resurrecting the Ugly American,” Food & Water Journal, Spring 1999, pp. 32-35.
33. Elizabeth Wilson, “Berkeley and Novartis strike a deal,” Chemical and Engineering News, December 14, 1998, p. 41.
34. Peggy Dye, “Harlem Faces the Vulture Culture”, Z Magazine, February 1992, pp. 55-59, and “The Night the Grassroots Got Away”, Village Voice, September 18, 1990, p. 9.
35. Jon Beckwith, “Thinking of Biology: A historical view of social responsibility in genetics,” BioScience, Vol. 43, No. 5, May 1993, pp. 327-333; Stuart A. Newman, “Idealist Biology,” Perspectives on Biology and Medicine, Vol. 31, No. 3, Spring 1988, pp. 353-368; Ruth Hubbard and Elijah Wald, Exploding the Gene Myth, Boston: Beacon Press, 1997.
36. Ronnie Cummins, “Activists in 16 Nations Carry Out Successful Global Days of Action,” Food Bytes No. 3, November 4, 1997, at www.purefood.org.
37. “Greenpeace quarantines genetically-altered Monsanto ‘X-field’ in Iowa,” Greenpeace U.S.A. press release, October 10, 1996; “Greenpeace stops genetically engineered soybeans destined for Europe on Mississippi River,” Greenpeace press release, November 19, 1996.
38. Freida Morris, “‘Monsanto: You Have Shamed Us’,” The Ecologist Vol. 28, No. 5, September/October 1998, pp. 304-305; proceedings of the first Biodevastation gathering are available in the U.S. Greens’ quarterly journal Synthesis/Regeneration Numbers 18 and 19, Winter and Spring 1999.
39. “USDA Bows to Public Pressure on ‘Organic’ Standards,” EnviroNews Service, May 8, 1998.
40. The acronym “RAGE” was first used by feminists opposed to reproductive technology and genetic engineering in the mid-1980s (FINRRAGE: Feminist International Network of Resistance to Reproductive and Genetic Engineering, founded in 1985), adapted by social ecologist Zoë Erwin for her M.A. thesis, “The Revolution Against Genetic Engineering,” (Goddard College, 1996), and renewed by the New England caucus at the first Biodevastation gathering in St. Louis to form NERAGE (New England, later NorthEast Resistance Against Genetic Engineering). The other RAGE groups as of February 2000 are (in order of their creation), BayRAGE (San Francisco), NWRAGE (Portland, Oregon), Down South RAGE (Memphis) and GrainRAGE (Minneapolis).
41. See Brian Tokar, “Resistance Against Genetic Engineering,” Z Magazine, June 2000, available at http://www.zmag.org (now zcommunications.org); also http://www.biodev.org.
42. American Corn Growers Association press release, “Corn growers call on farmers to consider alternatives to planting GMOs if questions are not answered,” August 25, 1999, at www.acga.org.
43. “Family Farmers Warn: If Your Next Crop is GMO, It May Be Your Last,” Farm Aid press release, November 23, 1999, posted to electronic list, biotech_activists@iatp.org.
44. Kimberly Wilson, “Safe Seeds,” GeneWatch (Cambridge, Massachusetts), Vol. 13, No. 1, February 2000, p. 16.
45. Reports and communiqués from many of these actions are archived at http://www.tao.ca/~ban/ar.htm.
46. Jeff Tuttle, “Vandals hit modified corn at UM ,” Bangor Daily News, August 20, 1999, p. B1 By ; “Taking it to the Fields: A Tale of Corn Sabotage,” Food & Water Journal, Fall 1999, pp. 14-24. Advocates of clandestine actions published a 20 page illustrated Nighttime Gardener’s Guide, available from nighttimegardeners@angelfire.com.